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Introduction
During the 1920s, British-American oil and railway
developers in the former province of Mosul created
burgeoning ethnic divides. Many of the people in the
Mosul region disagreed with the province coming
under the direct rule of Baghdad as they were
discontented with centralization. Yet, they lacked a
sense of a nationalist identity. The British
considered mineral exploitation more imperative
than these anti-centralization sentiments. As a
consequence, the British imperial power
disregarded the ethnic diversity of Mosul and their
objections to becoming part of a united Iraq. This is
evident when examining actions of European
consortium Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC).
Before the finalization of Mosul’s inclusion in Iraq,
APOC surveyed a pipeline and railway from Kirkuk
to Haifa in 1922. Mosul’s inclusion in Iraq, where the
town of Kirkuk lies, occurred in 1926.
Figure 1: Map of Iraq.1
Mineral resources in Iraq also engendered a dispute between British and American oil
ambitions. British oil hegemony assuaged the quarrel over oil resources, because U.S.
interests determined that aligning with the British imperial power would amount to them
obtaining mineral rights. Furthermore, British authority and U.S. ambitions for Iraqi oil
coincided with railway expansion, and they were attentive toward the potential Kirkuk-Haifa oil
and railway lines. Obtaining mineral and railway concessions was a priority for the U.S. State
Department. Nevertheless, the British sought to maintain their predominance over Iraqi oil. In
1925, U.S. Standard Oil Company bought part ownership of the Turkish Petroleum Company
(TPC). TPC was the main purveyor of oil after the 1925 Kirkuk-Haifa oil and railway
concession, an agreement officially signed between the Iraqi government and TPC in 1928.
British and American consortiums such as APOC and TPC were a factor in the Mosul
question. Consortium hegemony over mineral resources and railway infrastructure were the
dominant themes throughout U.S. correspondence during the 1920s.

Historiography of Iraq: Oil and Railways
Historical scholars of 1920s Iraq argue that the premise for the founding of the Iraqi state was
based on oil: therein lies the dichotomies of the historical scholarship. One argument leans
toward how oil influenced ethnic divides, while the other argument does not consider the oil
question and insinuates that when Iraq formed, the British took ethnic heterogeneity into
account. Another explanation suggests that oil was paramount to the British agenda in Iraq,
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while the British all together disregarded the issue of ethnic heterogeneity when creating the
Iraqi state. However, the scholarship lacks a concrete analysis on the connection between oil
and railways and how these issues brought to fruition conflict amongst the heterogeneous
population of Mosul. Iraqi oil and railways were capitulations granted by the Iraqi government
under the discretion of the British Iraqi Administration to British-American oil consortiums, while
the British government ignored the impact these capitulations were to have on the
heterogeneous population. Before Iraq’s creation, the area was made up of semi-autonomous
provinces where ethnic lines were blurred.2 The population in Mosul aligned themselves with
more than one ethnicity, and therefore, uniting Mosul, Basra and Baghdad into a single entity
led to an “emerging fault-line” amongst the heterogeneous population.3 Proposed oil and
railway lines that cut through the Mosul region was at the expense of Mosul’s autonomy. Mosul
came under Iraq’s wing because of an insistence for exploiting its potential mineral resources.
Peter Sluglett’s and William Stivers’ scholarship represent earlier historical analyses of Iraq
and oil, while demonstrating the importance of oil to the British. However, their scholarship
does not establish the connection between ethnic heterogeneity and the Mosul question. Peter
Sluglett’s Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country (2nd ed., 2007), whose first edition was
written in the 1970’s, and William Stivers’ Supremacy and Oil: Iraq, Turkey, and the AngloAmerican Order, 1918-1930 (1982) address the relationship between the British and the oil
companies who wanted concessionary power in Iraq. According to these scholars, Mosul’s
inclusion into the Iraqi state was a result of oil ambitions. Sluglett uses primary source
documentation from the British Foreign Office, Air Ministry, and Colonial office records,
including private and publicized documents. Continuing the tradition of using public and private
governmental documents, Stivers’ scholarship uses the Foreign Office Political Files, but he
also includes primary sources pertaining to U.S. foreign relations, several U.S. edited
document collections, and personal accounts.
The difference between Sluglett’s and Stivers’ arguments lie in their elucidation of British and
American oil ambitions. For instance, Sluglett argues that the British authorities set up the Iraqi
government in a way that was to best serve British interests, with concerns for “its
communications with India, the Empire air route, and the protection of the Persian and Iraqi
oilfields.”4 Like Sluglett, Stivers explains British involvement in Iraq as a strategic move in
maintaining control over India as well as Iraqi oil. 5 However, Stivers argues that British control
over Iraq served American interests because stability in the region meant tranquil conditions
for U.S. investment and trade.6 Charles Tripp’s History of Iraq (2000) and Toby Dodge’s
Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied provides a broader context
for the formation of the Iraqi state. Tripp argues that the British owned a substantial stake of
TPC, and therefore, these British authorities saw Mosul as an opportunity for revenue and the
possibility of removing Iraqi part-ownership of oil concessions.7 Tripp, Stivers, and Sluglett
mainly use British government documents in their historical work, while other scholarship uses
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a diverse subset of primary sources ranging from newspaper articles to poetry in addition to
government correspondence.
While Stivers’ and Sluglett’s main goal throughout their scholarship is to show British and U.S.
imperial concerns for oil, another theme throughout the literature establishes how imperial
mineral ambitions affected the ethnic heterogeneous population of Iraq. Arbella Bet-Shlimon in
her work “Group Identities, Oil, and the Local Political Domain in Kirkuk: A Historical
Perspective” (2012) argues that to consider Kirkuk’s oil as merely a commodity denies the
historical realities that oil produced for the population such as oil urbanization, which “created
ethnic identities and rivalries.”8 Meanwhile, Guiditta Fontana’s “Creating Nations, Establishing
States: Ethno-Religious Heterogeneity and the British Creation of Iraq in 1919-23” (2010)
argues that “establishment of nation-states was complicated by the existence of a variety of
minorities and rival ethno-religious groups,” and that “British policymakers took these factors
into account in 1919-20.”9 Though Guiditta’s work does not consider oil, her view is starkly
contrasted to Bet-Shlimon’s scholarship when concerning the effect of the British on Iraq.
Guiditta states that there were pre-existing ethnic rivalries throughout Iraq, while Bet-Shlimon
implicates that oil ambitions created the ethnic conflict within Kirkuk. Both scholars use
Colonial office records, and other governmental documents; however, Bet-Shlimon uses poetry
to accentuate the tumultuousness of oil urbanism during the 1950’s for Kirkukis.
One of the main themes throughout the scholarship on Iraq focuses on ethnic identities and
rivalries, and how oil and the British were factors in creating new issues after the formation of
Iraq. Another dichotomy within the literature concerns itself solely with the British and U.S. oil
interests in Iraq. The gap appears to lie within uniting both U.S. and British oil interests relative
to the central issue to the Mosul question of ethnic divides, while also correlating oil and
railways as a unifying factor of interest for the imperial ambitions. The literature on railways is
inherently scarce, as the most recent scholarship on 1920s Iraqi railways is Edward Mead
Earle’s Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism (1923),
and other historical scholarship tends to focus on the Baghdad railway prior to the creation of
Iraq such as Sean McMeekin’s The Berlin-Baghdad Express: the Ottoman Empire and
Germany’s Bid for World Power (2010). Throughout this work, it will be argued that the BritishAmerican concern for oil and railways created burgeoning ethnic rivalries in the Mosul region
during the interwar period, and that these imperial powers were backing Anglo-Persian Oil
Company and Turkish Petroleum Company without concern for the ramifications of having
Mosul governed by a Sunni Arab elite in Baghdad.

Iraqi Railways and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company: General Imperial Interests and its
Relationship with the Iraqi Government
During the 1920s, British imperial interests encompassed Iraqi railway infrastructure and oil
resources. While the British were in charge of the Iraqi mandate, the U.S. placed consulates in
Baghdad to build a cordial relationship with the Iraqi government. The U.S. consulates of
Bet-Shlimon, “Group Identities, Oil, and the Political Domain of Kirkuk: A Historical Perspective,” 915.
Guiditta Fontana, “Creating Nations, Establishing States: Ethno-Religious Heterogeneity and the British Creation of Iraq in
1919–23,” in Middle Eastern Studies, 46:1, 2, (Feb 12, 2010), accessed February 10, 2014, DOI:
10.1080/00263200902760535.
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Baghdad sent correspondence to the Department of State commenting on British affairs, with
an opportunistic eye for U.S. investment for Iraqi oil and railways. Prior to the Iraqi mandate,
American commercial enterprises had limited contact with Ottoman provinces: dates and
licorice root were their main imports, while the main export was oil into Iraq by Standard Oil
Company of New York. 10 By the 1920s, the Iraqi oil question concerned the U.S. Standard Oil
Company (Socony) and the U.S. State Department. A mutual attraction to oil linked the U.S.
State Department and Standard Oil together for “profit-seeking ambitions.”11
However, British imperial ambitions comprised of more than Iraqi oil and railway infrastructure,
because different philosophies for Middle Eastern policy were dependent on the division of
authority. The Colonial Office, Foreign Office, War Office and India office, were each given a
piece of power, which “ensured that visions for the territorial and political organization of the
occupied areas became a source of bureaucratic infighting.”12 On the other hand, the premise
for British post-war policy on Middle Eastern petroleum was a desire for mineral resource
hegemony.13 Once the British received the Iraqi mandate, a major shift in the political realities
of the inhabitants accumulated into hostility that led to the June 1920 revolt.14 Because of the
insurgents’ destruction of the railway lines, it was necessary to reconstruct the line and shut
down the route between Basra and Baghdad. The stability of the railway system throughout
Iraq required a grant to replace unsafe timber bridges with permanent lines. 15 This resulted in
an economic deficit for British authority between 1921 and 1922, due to railway infrastructural
development and the high cost of oil per ton. According to the Foreign Office report by the High
Commissioner on the Finances, Administration and Condition of Iraq, the requirement
necessary for capital investment was to ensure that the railways up to a “moderate standard of
equipment and to provide access to Karbala and Najaf.” Otherwise, the railways were not up to
a standard of use for achieving their commercial potentialities. 16
As a public utility, the Iraqi railways were unprofitable; therefore, the British considered
potential buyers. Correspondence between the American Consulate of Baghdad and the U.S.
Department of State pondered on whether the Iraqi government was to run the Mesopotamian
railways. The Iraqi railway question was due to the British Disposal and Liquidation
Commission contemplating the transfer of the Iraqi railways to the Iraqi government, in 1922.
Furthermore, the commission also reviewed the possibility of permitting the Iraqi government
to sell or lease railway properties to private companies.17 However, the British determined it
may prove more beneficial to concede railway and oil to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company
(APOC) than to sell the railways to the Iraqi government. That year, APOC took over the Hillah
to Basra rail line, to use the line’s materials for constructing a railway from Tikrit to Mosul by
Stivers, Supremacy and Oil, 108.
Ibid, 113.
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way of Kirkuk and Erbil.18 Heading the prospect was Sir AT Wilson, former British civil
commissioner of Baghdad from 1918-1920 and Resident Manager of APOC, who in 1922 was
“looking over the survey of the proposed railway and pipeline to the Mediterranean.”19
Nevertheless, the Iraqi government still hoped to purchase the railways.
In February 1923, an interview with the Minister of Public Works Yasin Pasha Al-Hashimi and
the American Consulate of Baghdad revealed that “the British were asking 3 ½ millions sterling
for the railways which consist of 580 miles, but [al-Hashimi] thought this amount exorbitant,
and opposed buying at these figures.”20 The Iraqi government could only afford to replace the
existing railways but could not afford to purchase the 580 miles of railway at war prices.
Though the British government in May 1923 transferred provisionally the management of the
railways to the Iraqi government’s Minister of Communications and Works, the British relied on
other sources for concessionary power, such as APOC, over the Mesopotamian railways. 21
Any power the Iraqi government had over the Mesopotamian railways was inherently limited.
The Iraqi government’s Minister of Public Works al-Hashimi was, however, in an unpopular
position with the British. Interestingly, al-Hashimi took advantage of his position to obtain both
land and use laws to validate such transactions as well as to enable tax exemption for his
behest.22 U.S. capital investment in railways and oil were an interest of al-Hashimi, which the
American consulate of Baghdad stated: “I told him that if American capital participated in the
exploitation of oil, I saw no reason why it should not be available for other necessary
developments, as soon as the status of the country was definitely determined and there is
reasonable hope of security.”23 al-Hashimi thought that TPC’s claims to oil was weak and
disfavored its ratification, while indicating that the Iraqi government was “opposed to giving any
concession to the Anglo Persian Oil Company if another can be found […].”24
The crux of al-Hashimi’s argument established a distaste for the control over the railway
system and its correlative, oil, for both APOC and TPC. In 1922, the American consulate
suspected that APOC was to receive control over the Mesopotamian railways, as it was certain
that “the so-called Government of Iraq will not operate them.”25 This perception came from the
apparent connection of APOC to the 1914 D’Arcy concession that gave APOC the ability to
build oil wells throughout the Ottoman Empire’s territories.26 APOC obtained its own route in
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Iraq in 1922, a line constructed from Ali Gharbi and maintained as a private tramline for the
company’s use only.27
In 1923, the British government granted APOC control of an Iraqi railway line in Khanakin City,
which gave APOC exclusivity for that particular line of 27½ miles in length.28 According to
Sluglett in Britain in Iraq, the Iraqi government concluded that more liberal control over the Iraqi
railways may lead to a more amicable relationship with Britain. The Iraqi governments “only
hope for amelioration lay in tinkering with the details of the Anglo-Iraqi relationship, and
trusting that Britain might eventually be persuaded.”29 By August 31, 1929, the Iraqi
government’s desire to purchase the Iraq railways, along with the port of Basra, from the
British had not occurred because the Iraqi government considered the asking price more than
what the properties were worth.30 Further speculation in November 6, 1929 on the issue of
Iraqi railways proved unfruitful since “the King’s speech at the opening of Parliament did not
touch on the [Iraqi] Government’s program regarding the taking over of the Iraq Railways.
Rumored that a mission was to be sent to London to negotiate but as yet no date of departure
has been set.”31 Nevertheless, the British wanted to maintain and extend railways while
furthering its oil prospects. A purported railway project envisaged by the British was to parallel
the route of the Mosul pipeline under both British and French discretion, and indirect U.S.
control.32
The Kirkuk-Haifa Line to the Mediterranean: The Implications of Oil and the Mosul
Question
The Mosul pipeline and railway concession was a settled matter by 1928 between the Iraqi
government and TPC consortium. However, the question of dominion over the Mosul region
was a separate dispute, entwined with the concern for oil. The British placed elites into
positions of authority within the Iraqi government that aligned themselves with British
policymaking. Some historians have suggested that the British- Iraqi government relationship
constituted a hybrid culture that enabled “the constant fusion and mutual synthesis between
the cultures of the colonizer and the colonized and their representation as “self” and “other”
become impossible to maintain.”33 While the hybrid relationship between “colonizer” and
“colonized” may apply to the Sunni elite and the British, and was a strategy the British tended
to use in other parts of Iraq, the theory does not reflect how much of the population within Iraq
lacked an amicable relationship with Britain and a voice in the main governmental body of
Baghdad.

27
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Baghdad was the central authority of the Iraqi government, led by a Sunni Arab elite; yet,
Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul consisted of a diverse population. On a religious level, according
to Guiditta Fontana, there were a significant number of Christian and Jewish minorities present
in an urban setting.34 Where as many of the Shi’a Arabs lived in the former vilayets Baghdad
and Basra, along with a considerable number of Sunnis in Baghdad.35 While Shi’as constituted
the majority of the Iraqi population like the other ethnicities, at the time they were not a single
community.36 In Northern Iraq, there were ethnic groups such as Turkmen, Kurds, Arabs, with
a smaller population of Chaldo-Assyrian Christians, and a larger Sunni population.37 However,
Turkmen, Kurds, and Arabs were a blurred ethnic concept to those who presided in the area
particularly because “an individual’s or family’s self-identity often stemmed from a combination
of their preferred language and social status rather than their ancestry.”38 Therefore, the
concept of nationalism was not prevalent during the 1920s amongst the ethno-heterogeneous
population of Iraq. On the other hand, the British and the U.S. consulate were averse to
nationalist sentiments, as they were concerned with maintaining control and stability over the
region for resource exploitation. After all, “America’s silent partnership with British power”
hinged itself on the mandate system’s “responsibility for bringing order to the underdeveloped
territories taken over from the defeated states.”39
While factors such as the complex ethno-religious heterogeneity of the former Ottoman
provinces of Basra, Mosul, and Baghdad, perhaps were considerations of the British
policymakers in 1919-20, the British opted for “strategic rather than ethnic arguments” for
defining the frontiers of Iraq.40 This was specifically evident in how the British conducted its
agreements, or rather lack thereof, with the Kurds. A group of elite Kurds advocated for
autonomy, sending a representative to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and leading to
further discussions at the Conference of London and the San Remo Conference of 1920, this
discussion was not a prevalent theme amongst the general Kurdish population. The San Remo
Conference amounted to Article 62 in the Treaty of Sèvres, signed in August 1920 that called
for “local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas.”41 Additionally, Article 64 detailed that
such regions included those neighboring Mosul. However, the British found that promises
based on creating ethno-homogenous states were inconvenient; after all, money and
manpower to enforce such a policy was not lucrative, and to add to matters, the Higher
Commissioner Sir Percy Cox advocated for the Kurdish fusion into the Iraqi state.42
The relationship between the policy of incorporation and the issue of Iraqi oil and railways may
seem unclear. Before the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, the British and French petroleum
ministers, Long and Bérenger, established a provisional covenant which amounted to “making
over Deutsche Bank’s former 25% share in the TPC (confiscated during the war by the
Custodian of Enemy Property) to French interests” in exchange for a former agreement of the
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French to hand over Mosul to Britain back in 1918. 43 Formalization of these arguments came
to their crux during the San Remo Oil Agreement of 1920. After obtaining stock in TPC, the
French was to have partial influence over the Kirkuk-Haifa line of 1928.
In the town of Kirkuk, there were those who identified as Kurdish that, along with other
Kirkukis, who opposed Mosul’s inclusion in Iraq.44 However, Kurdish nationalism was not a
dominant sentiment during the 1920s.45 The issue of the “Mosul Question” came to the
forefront during Iraqi centralization from 1918 to 1926. As “the seat of an Ottoman
administrative subdivision within the province of Mosul,” including Basra, it fell under
Baghdad’s authority during the Mandate period.46 Even after the British received the former
Ottoman vilayet of Mosul from the French, where a large Kurdish population resided, Mosul
was still a disputed territory because of Turkish claims to Mosul. However, as a result of “the
exigencies of creating the Iraqi state outweigh[ing] special claims of Kurds,” Britain took an
additional step by to inviting them to endorse or “vote” in favor of a constitutional monarchy of
King Faisal.47 In July 1921, Faisal’s election was at a “suspiciously high 96 percent” approval
rate from Iraqis.48 To further support this propaganda, according to one source, the Kurdish
regions in Mosul and Erbil Divisions “twice declared their intention of uniting with the Iraq, once
in June, 1921, before the arrival of the Amir Faisal, and again in August, […] they swore
allegiance to him as King.” 49 However, the Kirkuk Division asked for the postponing of the
decision and had not sworn allegiance to the King.50
A political fault line emerged in Kirkuk between those “who wished to cooperate with AngloIraqi centralization and those who opposed it,” while some elite families and tribes pandered to
both political sides of the Mosul question.51 For instance, one elite patriarch ‘Abd al-Majid Beg
obtained a relationship with the British authorities within Kirkuk and obtained a position as
governor.52 Despite these symbiotic relationships on a local level between the British and the
elites of Kirkuk, the British imperial agenda focused on the capital side of the Mosul question
specifically with regards to oil concessions and railway expansion. American consulate of
Baghdad John Randolph to the Secretary of State in Washington DC on July 10, 1924
reported that construction begun on the railway extension from Kingerban to Kirkuk. Consulate
Randolph explained that the Kingerban-Kirkuk line was to be finished by November of that
year, and noted that there was not an existing petroleum concession. Allegedly, the British
negotiated the Kirkuk concession with the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC). 53 Meanwhile,
the U.S. sought to influence the British positively by aligning with the imperial power, in hopes
of gaining oil rights in Iraq. It was Standard Oil’s partnership with TPC in 1925 that instituted
U.S. involvement in matters of oil in Iraq.

Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 70.
Bet-Shlimon, “Group Identities, Oil, and the Local Political Domain in Kirkuk: A Historical Perspective,” 917.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid, 916.
47
Holden, A Documentary History of Modern Iraq, 74.
48
Ibid.
49
Colonial Office, “Iraq. Report on Iraq Administration, April 1922—March 1923 [FO 371/8998],” 32.
50
Ibid.
51
Bet-Shlimon, “Group Identities, Oil, and the Local Political Domain in Kirkuk: A Historical Perspective,” 916/917.
52
Ibid, 917.
53
NAUS, RG59, M1370, reel 26, 890g.77/17, “Negotiations for Irrigation, Agricultural and Petroleum Concessions In Iraq
(Mesopotamia),” American Consulate of Baghdad John Randolph to the Secretary of State, Washington, July 10, 1924; 1/2.
43
44

9

Since 1922, the Kirkuk-Haifa rail line was in a state of negotiation. It seemed like the line was
going to be built by APOC under the discretion of AT Wilson. As Resident Manager of APOC,
Wilson’s association to the Haifa-Baghdad line, which was to connect to Kirkuk and Erbil, was
as a contributor to the surveying force for the potential railway and pipeline.54 According to
Wilson, Iraq needed improved communications “which are essential if its agricultural and
mineral resources are to be developed.”55 TPC received the Kirkuk line concession instead of
APOC in a 1925 agreement.
TPC was a consortium of oil companies originating prior to the First World War that had an
existing agreement with the Ottoman Empire for Mesopotamian oil prospecting. However, as a
result of the British being on the winning side at the end of the war, the German and Ottomans
surrendered their shares of TPC to “Allied interests.”56 By the late 1920s, the forfeited areas
formerly owned by Germany and the Ottoman Empire were “owned jointly by the AngloPersian Oil Company (23.75 per cent), Royal Dutch Shell (23.75 per cent), Compagnie
Français des Pétrole (23.75 per cent), a US-based consortium, later shared equally between
Standard Oil of New Jersey and Mobil, and Gulbenkian (5 per cent).”57 TPC negotiated an oil
concession agreement with the Iraqi government by March 1925. The TPC concession
agreement also marked a turning point in American involvement in Iraq. In 1925, Standard Oil
was able to participate in any projects TPC obtained. By 1928, the concession agreement
between TPC and the Iraqi government allowed Standard Oil to benefit from its relationship
with TPC.58 This meant a pipeline was to be built near the Kirkuk neighborhood, which led to
an oil urbanized city.59
Evidently, the American Consulate to the Secretary of State explained that TPC was creating a
pipeline from the oilfields in the Kirkuk area. 60 The pipeline, estimating to be 700 miles long,
was intended to reach the Mediterranean Sea at a Syrian port, and led “through a country
where there are many wells which would mean probably an important saving on water
transportation for the different pumping stations.”61 One consideration for the pipeline was for
TPC engineers and geologists to create the line from the Kirkuk oilfields via the Hit-RutbaHauran-Haifa route near the Hejaz Railway for an estimated 800 miles long.62 According to
Sluglett, by 1930 the compromise on the pipeline was to be above Rutba, with one part to
Haifa and another to Tripoli, which was formally agreed upon with TPC as the Iraq Petroleum
Company in March 1931.63
The relationship between Kirkuk and TPC was evident in terms of the 1925 agreement
between the Iraqi government and TPC. TPC and the Iraqi government’s agreement allowed
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the company control of particular areas of Iraq. For instance, the terms of the previous
concession agreement was for TPC to continue as a British-registered company and granted
exclusive rights of exploration in all of Iraq, not including the former vilayet of Basra.64 It was
under this agreement that put into motion the ratification of the tripartite Anglo-Turkish-Iraqi
Treaty by Iraqi parliament, which settled the Mosul question in July 1926.65 TPC had a fixed
period to select a number of land plots and to commit itself to begin drilling for oil within a few
years. For each metric ton of oil that TPC produced, they were to pay an agreed sum to the
Iraqi government. Meanwhile, the British relationship with TPC concerned itself with not only
the pipeline but also a railway to connect the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf in order
for the British Empire to have a developed line of communication as well as a way of guarding
the mineral resources and railroad infrastructure “to be fought for in case of future wars.”66 This
venture was in the works by the British since APOC planned to create a pipeline to the
Mediterranean as early as 1922, suggesting that an undertaking and attentiveness toward the
Kirkuk area preceded the TPC concession of 1928.

Conclusion
By 1931, IPC recognized Kirkuk as a beneficial center of industry and labor, which many
Kirkukis relied upon for their livelihood.67 However, the concern for oil in Kirkuk preceded the
TPC concession of 1928. A decision to build a
line from Kirkuk to the Mediterranean was in
deliberation since 1922. U.S. involvement in the
negotiations of the Kirkuk-Haifa line was a
result of Standard Oil’s (Socony) part
ownership of TPC.
Figure 2: Oil wells and camp of the Iraq
Petroleum Company.68
Despite Iraq gaining its independence from the
British by 1932, the conditions of British
authority remained. Many of the British officials
and advisers were present in Iraq and IPC’s control over oil in Kirkuk was unabated. 69 The
U.S. preferred Iraq under longer guidance by the British. This was because the U.S. wanted to
maintain their capitulations, while the British government instituted an initially de jure Iraqi
independence to lessen any imposing financial burdens that it had on Britain.70 Meanwhile, the
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66
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U.S. wanted Iraq to remain stable in order to protect its capital projects and its “open door”
policy. After all, the U.S. Wilsonian principle of “self-determination” was in fact married to the
idea of free and open markets. Therefore, preventing nationalistic sentiments amongst Iraqis
was imperative to U.S. oil ambitions, as in their mind, this would have brought instability within
the region. As long as the British authority preserved such stability, the U.S. enjoyed an open
market and avoided the expense of maintaining dominion.71
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